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A B S T R A C T 
We develop an analytical framework on the basis of the economics of business performance to 
provide quantitative insight into the link between a firm’s business model choices and their profit 
consequences. The method is applied to Walmart by building a qualitative representation of its 
business  model  and  mapping  that  representation  on  an  analytical  model  that  quantifies  the 
company’s  sources  of  advantage  over  time.    The  analysis  suggests  that  the  effectiveness  of  a 
particular business model depends not only on its design (its levers and how they relate to one 
another) but, most importantly, on its implementation (how the levers are pulled).  
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Business Model Evaluation: Quantifying Walmart’s Sources of Advantage 
1. Introduction 
In recent years the strategy field has become increasingly interested in the study of 
business  models.
2  Although  the  expression  was  introduced  long  ago  by  Peter  Drucker 
(1954), academic work on business models began just a decade ago in the context of the 
Internet boom, where entrepreneurs were asked to explain how their ventures would create 
value  (the  wedge  between  customers’  willingness  to  pay  and  suppliers’  willingness  to 
sell— Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996) and how value would be captured as profit. Indeed, 
the most common definition of business model is “the logic of the firm, the way it operates, 
and how it creates and captures value for its stakeholders.”
 3 
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2008, 2010, 2011) and Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 
(2010) operationalize this notion by decomposing business models into two fundamental 
elements: choices—such as policies, assets, and governance of policies and assets—and the 
consequences of these choices.  The causal links between choices and consequences help 
explain the logic of the firm, how it creates and captures value for its stakeholders. These 
authors also propose a methodology to represent business models qualitatively. 
In this paper we propose a novel approach to quantify the link between a firm’s 
choices and their consequences and, ultimately, to gain a better understanding of the virtues 
and weaknesses of a firm’s business model. The method builds on recent advances in the 
economics of business performance by Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999, 2013, 2014a,b) and 
relates  business  model  choices  to  profit  variations  over  time.  Its  starting  point  is  the 
observation that profits rise and fall for two reasons: changes in prices or in quantities. 
Specifically, a firm’s profits could increase for any of the following reasons: (a) selling 
goods at higher prices; (b) paying less for inputs, such as labor or capital; (c) selling more 
                                                 
2 The recent special issue of Long Range Planning on business models (April 2010) received more than 80 
submissions  and  attracted  contributions  from  scholars  such  as  David  Teece  and  Nobel  Prize  winning 
practitioner Muhammad Yunus. Zott, Amit and Massa (2011) review the growing literature in management 
on business models. A Google search for “Business Model” in October 2012 yielded 31.1 million hits. 
3 Long Range Planning (2008) call for papers for the Special Issue on “Business Models” by Charles Baden-
Fuller, Ian MacMillan, Benoît Demil, and Xavier Lecocq. 3 
 
goods while holding constant a positive cost markup; or (d) using fewer inputs per unit of 
good produced/sold. Note that (a) and (b) are related to prices whereas (c) and (d) are 
related to quantities. 
The  proposed  analytical  framework  combines  the  theory  of  index  numbers  and 
production theory. Index numbers produce estimates of the impact of price and quantity 
changes on profit change. The price effect provides insight on the impact of business model 
choices that affect profits through input and output prices (e.g., product range changes 
and/or new supply sources). The quantity effect captures the impact of choices that affect 
profits through input and output quantities (e.g., hiring more staff or investing in larger 
stores). Having obtained an aggregated estimate of the impact of price and quantity changes 
on profits, we explore the quantity effect in more detail. In particular, we use production 
theory to gain additional insight on the drivers of quantity changes and to measure the 
contribution of these drivers to profit change. This additional level of detail is helpful to 
better  understand  how  business  model  choices  leading  to  growth  contribute  to  higher 
profits. 
To demonstrate how the method can be applied to produce insights on how a firm’s 
business model operates, we apply the method to study the evolution of Walmart after its 
IPO in 1970, from 1971 to 2008. Walmart constitutes an ideal setting to apply our approach 
and demonstrate its value because: (i) there is a wealth of qualitative information about the 
company, which allows us to build a detailed business model representation, and (ii) being 
a public company, the accounting data needed for the analysis are readily available. The 
study  has  two  parts.  First,  we  use  information  from  annual  reports,  analyst  reports, 
academic  papers,  case  studies,  and  books  about  Walmart  to  describe  the  company’s 
business model choices over time. Second, we implement the quantitative model in order to 
determine the effect of Walmart’s choices on its performance. 
The results reveal that while Walmart’s business model did not change during the 36-
year  period  of  study,  by  emphasizing  different  elements,  each  CEO  implemented  the 
business model differently. Specifically, input and output prices, technological progress, 
sales volume, and volume of inputs employed played different roles under Walton, Glass, 4 
 
and Scott. Thus, the results suggest that the effectiveness of a particular business model 
depends not only on its design but also on its implementation. 
Under Sam Walton (1972-1988), Walmart deepened its policy of everyday low prices 
(EDLP),  which  led  to  negative  output  price  variation.  These  were  somewhat  offset  by 
favorable  input  price  concessions  obtained  from  vendors.  While  price  reductions  to 
customers  hurt  profits,  more  favorable  purchase  prices  from  vendors  had  a  substantial 
positive effect. The analysis also reveals that under Sam Walton, Walmart increased profits 
substantially  through  the  adoption  of  new  technology  (e.g.,  investment  on  a  satellite 
system,  uniform  product  codes,  or  automated  distribution  centers)  that  corrected  the 
inefficient  expansion  of  its  first  decade.  Thus,  embracing  new  technology  was  a  key 
determinant in Walmart’s future success. 
Walmart’s  success  during  David  Glass’s  (1988-2000)  period  was  due  to  business 
model choices aimed at increasing volume such as building new stores, increasing product 
variety, setting low prices, and implementing high-powered incentives for store managers. 
Technological  improvements  explain  only  a  small  fraction  of  the  company’s  profit 
variation over this period. 
The third and last period of the study corresponds to Lee Scott’s tenure (2000-2008). 
Our results show weaker EDLP and cost controls. Indeed, value added per dollar sold and 
input prices—labor costs, mainly—were on the rise under Scott’s tenure. Finally, our study 
indicates that by the early 1980s Walmart had become the most efficient discount retailer in 
the United States, a position it held through the end of our sample. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the concept of business 
model,  introduces  the  terminology  of  business  lever  and  describes  Walmart’s  most 
important  business  model  choices.  Section  3  presents  the  methodology.  Section  4  is  a 
description  of  the  dataset.  Section  5  presents  the  results.  Section  6  concludes  with  a 
discussion of the advantages and drawbacks of the method. 5 
 
2. Walmart’s Business Model 
The notion of the business model is recent topic in the scholarly literature. In the 
1990s,  as  new  ways  of  doing  business  that  subverted  the  established  logics  of  value 
creation  and  value  capture  emerged,  practitioners  used  the  expression  to  describe  how 
untried e-business ventures were to operate (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Magretta, 
2002). The term was thus used to describe a wide diversity of novel, heterodox e-commerce 
firms. 
There is a myriad of definitions of the business model. This has led several authors to 
summarize and classify these definitions (e.g. Hedman and Kalling, 2003; Baden-Fuller and 
Morgan, 2010; Zott, et al., 2011) and to provide theoretical foundations (Lecocq et al, 
2010). Doz and Kosonen (2010) state that business models can be defined both objectively 
and  subjectively.  The  objective  definition  corresponds  to  the  structure  of  the  firm’s 
relationships and procedures (e.g. Teece, 2010) and the subjective definition relates to the 
cognitive  structures  that  shape  the  managerial  choices  concerning  a  company  (e.g. 
Tikkannen et al., 2005). The present approach is “objective” since its goal is to examine the 
structural features of Walmart’s business model and their profit implications. 
In this study, we use the conceptual framework developed by Casadesus-Masanell 
and  Ricart  (2010).  According  to  them,  a  business  model  is  composed  of  two  types  of 
element: choices made by the management and the consequences of these choices. There 
are three types of choices: policies, assets, and governance of assets and policies. Policy 
choices  refer  to  courses  of  action  that  the  firm  adopts  for  all  aspects  of  its  operation. 
Examples  include  opposing  the  emergence  of  unions;  locating  plants  in  rural  areas;  or 
providing high-powered monetary incentives. Asset choices refer to decisions regarding 
tangible resources, such as manufacturing facilities, a satellite system for communicating 
between offices, or the use by an airline of a particular aircraft. Governance choices refer to 
the structure of contractual arrangements that confer decision rights over policies or assets. 
For example, a given business model may contain (as a choice) the use of certain assets 
such as a fleet of trucks, which leads on to a governance choice for the firm as to whether it 
should own the fleet or lease it from a third party. Consequences can be flexible or rigid. 6 
 
The flexibility of a consequence is determined by how fast it changes, as the choices that 
produce it vary. 
Casadesus-Masanell  and  Ricart’s  framework  is  simple,  flexible,  and  bridges 
industrial organization and the resource-based view, two alternative perspectives for the 
study of competitive advantage. According to the resource-based view, what determines a 
firm’s success is control over valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable resources (Barney, 
1991). The industrial organization perspective, developed by Porter (1980, 1985), portrays 
the firm as a collection of activities on which competitive advantage resides. Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart (2010) and Zott and Amit (2010) recognize the importance of activities 
(policies) and assets as descriptors of a firm’s business model. And, by incorporating the 
governance  of  assets  and  policies,  Casadesus-Masanell  and  Ricart  (2010)  also  consider 
insights from transaction cost economics. 
The framework has two important additional elements. First, there is the idea that 
consequences are sometimes rigid, meaning that some choices made by the firm have a 
cumulative effect. This provides the “longitudinal dimension” explicitly sought by Hedman 
and Kalling (2003). The second element is the inclusion of causal relationships between 
choices  and  consequences.  Choices  produce  consequences.  Furthermore,  consequences 
may generate other consequences, or enable choices. This feature can also be found in the 
dynamic framework developed by Lecocq et al. (2006). 
The level of detail in a business model representation depends on the objectives of the 
practitioner or researcher. It is important to bear in mind the tradeoff between tractability 
and realism, as mentioned by Casadesus-Masanell and Larson (2009) when choosing the 
degree  of  precision  in  the  representation.  Casadesus-Masanell  and  Ricart  (2008,  2010) 
describe  two  methods  of  simplifying  a  business  model  depiction.  One  is  aggregation, 
which consists of grouping choices and consequences into larger constructs. The other is 
decomposability, which refers to the study of parts of a business model that can be analyzed 
in isolation. What follows makes use of aggregation and decomposability. 7 
 
2.1 Performance and discount retail business model Levers  
Walmart’s performance has been impressive. Figure 1 presents the evolution of its 
real profits. In 2008, profits were nearly $1.8 billion 1970 dollars, 436 times greater than 
what the company earned in 1972. The compound annual growth rate was 17.82% for a 38-
year period and the value added increased from $29.52 million constant dollars in 1971 to 
$17.14 billion in 2008.  
 [INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Several papers and books claim to have established the key to Walmart’s success as if 
it was due to a single silver bullet. Consistent with Porter (1996), this study’s view is that 
what explains the firm’s superb performance is an integrated set of choices. After reviewing 
publicly available information on the company—facts disclosed in its annual reports (years 
1971-2008),  analyst  reports,  academic  papers,  case  studies,  and  books
4—  we  have 
identified  eight  distinctive  categories  of  levers  (the  categories  of  choices  as  defined  in 
Porter’s value chain; Porter, 1985) that define the generic discount retail business model:  
1. Pricing. Discount retailers determine the prices of their merchandise and whether or 
not to price discriminate. 
2. Pressure on vendors. Discount retailers choose how much pressure to exert on vendors 
to obtain favorable terms and conditions. They also look to build mutually beneficial 
partnerships with suppliers in order to create more value. 
3.  Investment  in  technology.  At  one  extreme,  discount  retailers  may  incorporate  the 
latest  technologies  in  their  daily  processes  (e.g.  investments  in  satellite  systems, 
                                                 
4 The list of discount retailing levers is the result of the analysis of several sources of documentation: annual 
reports from Walmart (1971-2008) and Kmart (1971-2001); analyst reports (Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Global 
Insight Inc., Investext Group, and Thomson Financial, among others); case studies (Ghemawat, 1989; Bradley 
and Ghemawat, 2002; Ghemawat et al., 2004; Oberholzer-Gee, 2006); books (Walton, 2002; Fishman, 2006; 
Brunn 2006); and research articles (Graff and Ashton, 1994; Basker, 2005a,b; Hausman and Leibtag, 2007; 
Jia, 2008; Holmes, 2011; Basker et al., 2012). For Walmart’s business model description we also consulted 
Graff (1998), Drogin (2003), Dube and Jacobs (2004), Dube and Wertheim (2005), Dunnett and Arnold 
(2006), Bonacich and Wilson (2006), Burt and Sparks (2006), Basker and Noel (2007) and Basker and Pham 
Hoang (2008). The report The Economic Impact of Wal-Mart from Global Insight (2005) was particularly 
helpful.  8 
 
uniform product codes, Radio Frequency Identification RFID) and, at the other, may 
follow “artisanal” procedures (e.g. manual inventory systems). 
4.  Human  resource  practices.  Discount  retailers  establish  different  policies  that 
characterize  their  relationships  with  employees:  compensation  policies,  power  of 
incentives, screening of new employees, and so on. 
5. Expansion policies. Discount retailers choose whether to locate their stores in rural, 
suburban, or urban areas and the rate at which new stores are added to the company. 
6. Product selection. Discount retailers must choose the mix of goods they sell: private 
labels  vs.  national  brands,  selection  of  product  categories,  and  selection  within 
categories. 
7. Cost consciousness. Discount retailers seek to minimize overhead to boost profits. 
However not all retailers do so the same way or with the same intensity. For example, 
some have lavish headquarters while others choose austere offices. 
8.  Customer  service.  Discount  retailers  choose  how  to  treat  their  customers.  Some 
retailers create a family atmosphere where customers are welcomed to the premises 
and persuaded to buy certain articles or are actively handheld. Others offer more 
leeway and only interact directly with customers if they request information. The 
customer  service  lever  also  includes  store  appearance,  customer  support,  return 
policy, and complaint management. Figure 2 shows how each of these levers is linked 
with  each  of  the  elements  that  explain  the  change  in  profits.  These  elements  are 
described in detail in the methodology section. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010) indicate the dual nature of the notion of business 
model. On the one hand, it represents a scale model, which corresponds to a description of 
an organization and its interactions. On the other hand, it is an example, a role model. The 
lever  concept  is  useful  for  understanding  this  dual  nature.  Levers  capture  the  “scale 
features” of business models. 9 
 
Firms  make  particular  choices  to  configure  each  of  these  levers  (Porter  and 
Siggelkow, 2008). These choices correspond to the role model nature of business models. 
Different choices generate different consequences. Therefore, a particular set of choices 
affects the success or failure of a business model. The following is a description of how the 
different Walmart CEOs pulled these levers (i.e., configured their activities) during their 
respective  tenures.  While  none  of  these  eight  levers  changed  over  the  course  of  the 
company’s history (as Walmart remained a traditional discount retailer), different leaders 
made dissimilar choices for some of them. 
2.2 Business model choices under Sam Walton 
Sam Walton and his brother Bud franchised several Ben Franklin variety stores in the 
early forties (Walmart Annual Report,
 1974, p.4).
5 Walton wanted more freedom in the 
administration of these stores and when Ben Franklin rejected his idea of big stores in small 
towns, Walton decided to create his own chain (Graff and Ashton, 1994). The first Walmart 
store  opened  in  1962  in  Rogers,  Arkansas  (AR,  1974,  p.  4).  Walton  was  CEO  and 
Chairman almost uninterruptedly from 1962 to his retirement in 1988, Walton ceded his 
position as CEO to Ronald Mayer, a former Executive Vice President of Administration 
and Finance, in 1974. Walton resumed control in 1976, and tailored Walmart in accordance 
with  his  beliefs  about  how  a  discount  retailing  business  should  be  run.  Walton  also 
travelled across the U.S. and abroad searching for innovative practices to copy; he found 
many, but usually implemented them differently. Walton’s original vision is reflected in the 
choices he made for the levers described above. 
1. Pricing. Early in his career, Walton realized that by setting low prices, he could 
boost sales growth by much more than the percentage reduction in mark-up (Walton, 1992, 
p.  119).  When  he  entered  the  discount  retailing  business,  he  applied  this  principle 
obsessively,  always  trying  to  beat  the  competition  in  this  dimension.    He  dubbed  this 
choice:  “Everyday  low  prices  (EDLP)”  (Originally  it  was  dubbed  “everyday  discount 
prices” AR, 1977, p.5).  The main difference from other retailers was that Walmart always 
                                                 
5 In what follows, Walmart Annual Report will be abbreviated as AR.  10 
 
offered  its  merchandise  at  the  lowest  price  possible  instead  of  offering  promotional 
discounts. This choice created a low-price reputation for Walmart which increased sales 
volume as well as reducing the need for frequent advertising. 
2. Pressure on vendors. While Walmart developed a reputation for hard bargaining 
with its vendors, the concept of “vendor partnership” was developed under Walton (AR, 
1988, p. 10). The idea was to strengthen the business relationship between Walmart and its 
vendors by exchanging information about sales and inventory levels thus creating more 
value by cutting transaction costs and increasing efficiency. Walmart strategically located 
its distribution centers to solve the replenishment problem that the company faced in its 
early  days  (Walton,  1992,  p.52).  This  enables  the  firm  to  save  money  by  obtaining 
discounts  from  vendors  for  bulk  purchasing.  In  addition,  EDLP  resulted  in  huge  sales 
volume and Walmart quickly became a major distribution channel for many of its vendors. 
No  vendor  accounted  for  more  than  2.8%  of  the  company’s  total  purchases  in  1985 
(Ghemawat, 1989). 
3. Investment in technology. Ronald Mayer, Walmart’s CEO from 1974 to 1976, was 
a  major  advocate  of  the  use  of  technology  to  reduce  costs  (Walton,  1992,  p.90).  On 
returning to the helm of the company, Walton adopted Mayer’s ideas (Walton, 1992, p.91). 
Walmart was an early adopter of uniform product codes (UPC) at the point of sale which 
reported the location of any item at any time (AR, 1985, p 8). The roll out of UPCs began 
in 1983 and ended in 1988, two years ahead of Kmart (at the time, a larger company than 
Walmart) (Bradley and Ghemawat, 2002). Walmart’s satellite system was set up in 1983 at 
a cost of $20 million (Ghemawat, 1989) and it was completed in 1987 (AR, 1988, p.2). 
Walmart’s  investments  in  technology  helped  enhance  communication  between 
headquarters, stores, and vendors. 
4. Human resource practices. Walton’s view of human resource practices at Walmart 
is manifest in the following quote: “If you want the people in the stores to take care of the 
customers, you have to make sure you’re taking care of the people in the stores” (Walton, 
1992, p.80). The company implemented a varied array of high-powered incentives to attract 
talent, especially store managers. Initially, Walton lured talent from other companies by 11 
 
offering them a percentage of the profits made by the store. (Walton, 1992, p.132)  Later, 
when Walmart went public, a stock ownership plan was set up. 
5. Expansion policies. According to Walton, an important determinant of Walmart’s 
success was its choice of location: “Our key strategy was to put good-sized stores into little 
one-horse towns which everybody else was ignoring” (Walton, 1992, p.109). At least as 
important was Walmart’s method of geographic expansion. Walmart started in rural areas 
in the southern region of the country, grew by building stores close to existing distribution 
centers, and then expanded to other regions (Graff and Ashton, 1994). Walmart would 
always  push  from  the  inside  out  rather  than  making  long  jumps  and  later  backfilling 
(Ghemawat, 1989). The main advantage of this policy was the development of a dense 
distribution network that allowed the firm to spread costs and exploit economies of density 
(Graff and Ashton, 1994). 
6. Product selection. Walmart sought to project an image “as the competitive, one-
stop  shopping  center  for  the  entire  family  where  customer  satisfaction  is  always 
guaranteed.” (AR, 1975, p.2) Consequently, the company extended the product categories 
offered in its stores by including jewelry, shoes, photo labs, and pharmacies, as well as 
automotive centers. Early forays into groceries were undertaken under Walton (AR, 1988, 
p.3). The company offered national brands and for some products (such as apparel, health 
and beauty care, and dog food) also had private brand offerings (AR, 1984, p.4). Various 
retail formats were tested to attract customers with specific needs. These alternative retail 
formats had more limited product selections across categories. The most successful of these 
ventures  was  Sam’s  Club,  a  warehouse  club  that  targeted  customers  who  purchased 
wholesale  amounts.  Another  significant  aspect  of  Walmart’s  product  selection  was  the 
“Buy American” program, set up in 1985, to sell American products and reduce the U.S. 
trade deficit (AR, 1989, p.9). 
7.  Cost  consciousness.  Walton  emphasized  cost  cutting  as  one  of  the  pillars  of 
Walmart’s  culture.  This  was  accomplished  through  the  systematic  elimination  of 
superfluous expenses. There are many accounts of how tightly Walmart controlled costs. 
For example, whenever possible, managers (including Sam Walton) shared hotel rooms and 12 
 
walked instead of taking taxis. Likewise, Walmart made a practice of calling its vendors 
collect (Bradley and Ghemawat, 2002). 
8. Customer service. Walmart implemented policies that were aimed at creating a 
friendly shopping environment where customers felt they were part of a family. Walton 
reminded all employees in 1989 that customers should be treated as guests (AR, 1989, p.2). 
Walmart began formally implementing the “Aggressive Hospitality” program in 1984 (AR, 
1985, p.4): customers were welcomed by “people greeters” and enjoyed such benefits as 
extended  opening  hours,  free  parking,  no-hassle  refund  and  exchange  policies,  speedy 
checkout  lanes,  wider  aisles,  and  clean  stores  (AR,  1984,  p.4;  AR,  1988,  p.4).
6  The 
company sponsored social programs in the communities where it was present (AR, 1988, 
p.4). 
2.3 Walmart under Glass and Scott 
David Glass (1988-2000) 
Walton  stepped  down  as  CEO  in  1988.  His  successor,  David  Glass,  had  joined 
Walmart  in  1976  where  he  served  as  Chief  Financial  Officer  (CFO),  Chief  Operative 
Officer  (COO),  and  President  prior  to  his  appointment  as  CEO.
7  If  Walton  was  the 
visionary  leader,  David  Glass  was  the  operational  wizard  who  expanded  his  vision  to 
transform the company into the world’s largest discount retailer. Glass continued to use the 
business model inherited from Walton, but pulled some levers differently. 
Walmart invested in information technologies to link stores with vendors (AR, 1997, 
p.12). Glass also strengthened pressure on vendors. As the company grew, vendors became 
increasingly dependent on Walmart. For example, in 1993, 10% of Procter & Gamble’s 
(P&G) sales went through Walmart. However, that year, P&G represented less than 2.4% 
of Walmart’s purchases (Bradley and Ghemawat, 2002). This pressure was so intense that 
                                                 
6 Elements of “Aggressive Hospitality” had been applied earlier on a non-formal basis. 
7 Walmart.com. 2009.  David Glass to Retire From Wal-Mart Board of Directors. 
http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/investors/david-glass-to-retire-from-wal-mart-board-of-directors-
1278353, Accessed October 16
th, 2013. 13 
 
many vendors chose to outsource production to low-wage countries (Bonacich and Wilson, 
2006).  Relatedly, Glass deemphasized the “Buy American Program.” 
There  were  also  changes  in  product  selection.  During  the  Glass  years,  Walmart 
expanded the use of private brands. Walmart developed these brands to offer customers 
opening price points (AR, 2003, p.6), i.e. the lowest price available in the store for an item.
8 
The use of private brands was well aligned with Walmart’s pricing lever (EDLP, as under 
Walton). Walmart also moved decisively to include groceries in its products offered at 
Supercenters (AR, 1999, p.6). A supercenter was a discount store combined with a grocery 
store  and  other  small  departments.  When  Walton  left  the  company  there  were  three 
supercenters; after Glass left the company, the number had risen to 721. In fact, Glass 
started replacing discount stores with supercenters. 
Under Glass, Walmart continued Walton’s growth strategy in the U.S. and opened 
stores in all fifty states. The number of stores increased from 1,364 in 1988 to 3,989 in 
2000.  However,  there  were  also  changes  in  the  geographic  expansion  policies  he  had 
inherited from Walton. Specifically, Glass built more of its stores in suburban locations and 
also invested heavily abroad. In 2000, a quarter of all Walmart stores were located outside 
the U.S. (AR, 2001, p.6). 
While  human  resource  practices  did  not  change  much,  the  company  became  the 
largest private employer in the U.S. (AR, 1997, p.11) and the largest retailer in Mexico and 
Canada (AR, 2000 p.11). As a consequence, Walmart’s human resource practices were 
under increased public scrutiny. 
Lee Scott (2000-2008) 
Lee Scott became Walmart’s CEO in January 2000. With the exception of human 
resource practices, Scott did not significantly alter the configuration of Walmart’s business 
model  levers.  However,  he  had  to  wrestle  with  important  changes  in  the  external 
environment. At the same time, Walmart’s size made it particularly vulnerable to criticism. 
                                                 
8 Walmart also offered premium brands such as “Sam’s American Choice,” which were manufactured in the 
U.S. 14 
 
Moreover, Kmart’s 2002 bankruptcy had profound effects on the public perception of the 
company. 
During Scott’s early tenure as CEO, Walmart faced a number of criticisms regarding 
its human resource practices. Claims were made that it mistreated non-managerial workers 
by paying them low wages and providing poor benefits (Dube and Jacobs, 2004; Dube and 
Wertheim, 2005). The company was also accused of favoring men over women in a lawsuit 
filed in 2001.
9 Furthermore, Walmart opposed two attempts at unionization: meat cutters in 
Jacksonville, Texas in 2000 and workers from a Quebec Walmart store in 2005 (Bair and 
Bernstein, 2006).
10 As a consequence of these challenges, the company offered improved 
health  benefits  to  employees  (AR,  2006,  p.13)  and  implemented  new  job  and  salary 
structures for non-managerial workers (AR, 2005, p. 26). 
Walmart continued to build new stores in the U.S., but the main source of growth 
came from the international stores.
11 Likewise, Scott transformed many existing discount 
stores  into  supercenters,  which  altered  the  merchandise  mix  by  further  expanding  into 
groceries. At the same time, Sam’s Club faced increased competition from Costco, which 
surpassed  Sam’s  in  sales  volume  (Ghemawat  et  al,  2004).  Sam’s  Club  tested  several 
defensive strategies such as focusing on business customers (AR, 2004, p.21) and offering 
luxury items (AR, 2006, p.15).  
To  increase  margins,  Scott  expanded  Walmart’s  global  sourcing  activities. 
Specifically,  the  company  began  to  manage  its  global  procurement  directly  rather  than 
relying on third parties (AR, 2003, p.3).
12 This measure sought to further reduce vendors’ 
prices. Relatedly, Walmart’s investment in technology increased the company’s leadership 
in managing vendor inventories. 
                                                 
9 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the class-action lawsuit in June 20, 2011. The Court denied that the 
lawsuit fulfilled the requirements of a “class-action rules” (Liptak, A. 2011. “Justices rules for Wal-Mart in 
class-action bias case”. New York Times. June 20
th). 
10 Zimmerman, A. 2000. “Pro-union butchers at Wal-Mart win a battle, but lose the war.” Wall Street Journal 
Online Edition, April, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB955407680495911513.html, Accessed December 10
th, 
2011.  
11 Some of these business ventures failed (e.g. Germany and Korea) which might have encouraged Walmart to 
change course towards a more painstaking international expansion as related by Burt and Spark (2006). 
12 Saporito, B. 2003. “Can Wal-Mart get any bigger?” Time Magazine. January 13. 15 
 
Finally,  during  this  period  Walmart  intensified  its  philanthropic  activities  and  its 
efforts  to  improve  its  public  image.  The  company  assisted  New  Orleans  following 
Hurricane  Katrina,  became  largest  contributor  to  charity  in  the  U.S.  (AR,  2005,  p.10), 
invested heavily in advertising, and created a webpage to fend off criticism (AR, 2005, 
p.14).
13 
3. Quantifying the Effect of Business Model Choices 
The proposed method relies on index numbers and production theories to assess the 
impact of Walmart’s choices on the evolution of profits over time. The roots of the index 
numbers theory can be traced back to the 18th century. It has been subject of continuous 
and uninterrupted research because it is the theory used by the national departments of 
statistics to produce quantitative economic information.
14 This information influences the 
behavior of economic agents. 
The complexity of a modern economy is no different from an organization such as 
Walmart. Hence, this research extends the index numbers methodology to the study of 
business models. This approach is complemented with production theory, which provides 
the fundamentals required to define concepts such as productivity, technical change, and 
operating  efficiency  in  the  context  of  assessing  economic  performance.  Once  they  are 
defined, these concepts can be incorporated naturally as explanatory variables of profit 
change, our measure of financial performance. 
The  framework  by  Casadesus-Masanell  and  Ricart  (2008,  2010,  2011)  facilitates 
mapping choices with theoretical constructs of the production theory and these constructs 
with performance. The combination of index numbers and production theory is used in this 
application  as  a  tool  to  quantify  these  theoretical  constructs.  Figure  2  shows  the 
implementation of the method for the case of Walmart. This approach has the advantages of 
                                                 
13  Barbaro,  M.,  Gills,  J.  2005.  “Wal-Mart  at  the  forefront  of  the  hurricane  relieve.”  Washington  Post, 
September 6. 
14 Balk (2008) provides an updated revision of the theory of index numbers and an interesting historical 
introduction 16 
 
using commonly accessible data and not requiring the assumption of profit-maximizing 
behavior, which is controversial in the field of management. 
The method is related to work by Siggelkow (2001) and Porter (1996) to study the 
impact of business choices on performance based on production frontiers or on fitness 
landscapes (Levinthal and Warglien, 1999; Rivkin, 2000). In the case of Siggelkow (2001) 
and Porter (1996) the frontier is built as a map directly connecting business choices and 
performance measures. In the present case, the frontier is a production possibility frontier, a 
well-known concept in the economic literature. 
Our method offers an alternative to the traditional econometric approach
15 based on 
regression where the dependent variable is a performance measure (e.g., return on assets, 
profits)  and  the  independent  variables  are  those  of  interest  to  the  researcher.  The 
methodology  implemented  in  this  study  is  based  on  mathematical  programming  (Data 
Envelopment  Analysis,  DEA),  and  does  not  require  large  samples  as  is  the  case  with 
regression methods. This approach does not impose functional forms and uses the best 
performers in the industry as a benchmark rather than average performance, as is common 
in regression analysis. However, it does not offer the flexibility that a regression model 
could provide (e.g., testing whether a particular exogenous variable is related with profit 
change). The method dissects profits within the tradition of production theory rather than 
making assumptions about possible explanatory variables of profit change. 
The method has two levels of analysis (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1999). The first uses 
publicly available information on Walmart’s prices and quantities to explain variation in 
profits through index numbers. The price effect measures the impact of Walmart’s policies 
affecting input and output prices on profits. The quantity effect measures the impact of 
decisions  on  output  or  input  quantities  on  profits.  Recently,  Boussemart  et  al.  (2012) 
present a method that uses index number theory and profit frontiers to compare profits 
between  different  firms.  Hence,  index  numbers  are  useful  not  only  to  evaluate  the 
effectiveness of a particular business model and its implementation, but also to understand 
interactions between competitors. 
                                                 
15 Zott and Amit (2007, 2008) are an example of the econometrics approach applied in the business model 
context.  17 
 
The  second  level  of  analysis  decomposes  the  quantity  effect.  To  do  this,  such 
concepts as the production possibilities set and the production possibility frontier must be 
introduced. Production theory offers additional insight into the quantity effect using well-
known  economic  performance  measurement  concepts.  This  level  of  detail  is  useful  to 
understand how Walmart’s growth policies contributed to higher profits. In addition, it is 
possible to explore the effects on profits of technological progress and efforts to achieve 
higher efficiency levels. The empirical application of this second layer of analysis requires 
the construction of a dataset with information about other firms in the industry. 
Figure 3 is a visual representation of the method. It describes the change in profit as 
the result of the price and quantity effects (first level). The quantity effect is decomposed 
using production theory (second level). The remainder of this section provides technical 
details on both levels of analysis. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
First level 
The first level of analysis decomposes change in profits into a quantity effect and a 
price effect. Profit (π) is defined as the difference between revenue and operating cost 
where revenue is given by R = p
Ty = Σpmym and operating cost by C = w
Tx = Σwnxn. 
Output vectors are represented by y = (y1,…,yM) ∈ R 
  and  input vectors by x = (x1,…,xN) 
∈ R 
 . In addition, output price vectors are denoted p = (p1,…,pM) ∈ R  
   and input price 
vectors w = (w1,…,wN) ∈ R  
  . Profit is expressed as π = R - C = p
Ty - w
Tx, and profit 
change, from period t to period t+1, is defined as 
π
t+1 - π
t = [p
T(y
t+1 – y
t) – w
T(x
t+1 – x
t)] + [y
T(p
t+1 – p
t) – x
T(w
t+1 – w
t)].          (1) 
Vectors p, y, w and x are averages of current and next period vectors, where p = ½(p
t + 
p
t+1), y = ½(y
t + y
t+1) and so on. The first term on the right hand side of expression (1) is the 
quantity effect, showing the impact of quantity changes on profit change. The second term 
is  the  price  effect,  which  shows  the  impact  of  price  changes  on  profit  change.  Each 18 
 
expression has two components. In the case of the price effect, the first component, y
T(p
t+1 
–  p
t)  quantifies  the  variations  in  the  prices  of  outputs;  as  discussed  below,  in  this 
application  the  change  is  measured  in  value  added  per  unit  of  output.  The  second 
component,  x
T(w
t+1  –  w
t),  measures  the  impact  on  profit  of  variations  in  input  prices. 
Equation (1) expresses changes in profit using Bennet quantity and price indicators (p, y, w 
and x).
16 
Second level 
Using production theory (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1999, 2014a and De Witte and 
Saal, 2010), the second level of analysis further decomposes the quantity effect into an 
activity effect, an operating efficiency effect, and a technical change effect: 
p
T(y
t+1 – y
t) – w
T(x
t+1 – x
t) = [p
T(y
t+1 – y
t) – w
T(x
C – x
B)]                        Activity Effect 
+ w
T(x
t – x
A) – w
T(x
t+1 – x
C)      Operating Efficiency Effect 
+ w
T(x
A – x
B).                                 Technical Change Effect 
(2) 
The technology available in one period corresponds to the period’s production possibility 
frontier  F  and  its  convex  hull  h(F)  =  {(y,x):  x  can  produce  y}  is  the  set  of  feasible 
input/output combinations given F. Figure 4 shows the production possibility frontiers and 
the convex hull of period t. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Input vectors x
A, x
B, and x
C are theoretical constructs. Specifically, x
A is the efficient 
amount of input needed to produce realized output level y
t with technology F
t; x
B is the 
                                                 
16 Bennet (1920) advocates using the arithmetic mean of price and quantities to evaluate change. We follow 
this approach because Diewert (2005) has shown that the Bennet indicators have a set of properties that make 
them superior to the traditional Laspeyres and Paasche indicators. 19 
 
efficient amount of input needed to produce realized output level y
t with technology F
t+1; 
and x
C is the efficient amount of input needed to produce realized output level y
t+1 with 
technology F
t+1. 
Figure 4 (for the case M = N = 1) is useful for understanding the decomposition. The 
activity effect measures how much variation in profits is due to changes in sales volume and 
change  in  the  volume  of  inputs  employed  (making  efficient  use  of  the  latest  available 
technology in the retailing industry). This corresponds to a movement along the production 
possibility  frontier  of  period  t+1  and  is  indicated  by  the  arrow  connecting  operating-
efficient vectors (x
B, y
t) and (x
C,y
t+1). The activity effect contributes to or detracts from 
profit  depending  on  whether  the  change  in  outputs  exceeds  or  falls  short  of  the 
corresponding change in the efficient quantities of inputs, with the changes being evaluated 
at Bennet output and input prices, ﾠp and w. Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999) have shown that 
in a situation with multiple outputs and inputs, the activity effect also reflects changes in 
the mixes of outputs and inputs. However, in the case of Walmart, it should mainly reflect 
the impact of the company’s efficient growth. 
The operating efficiency effect measures the change in the difference between the 
chosen amount of inputs to produce the observed level of output and the efficient amount of 
inputs needed to produce that level of output. To produce a valuation of the operating 
efficiency of the firm, we multiply these differences in inputs by the Bennet input price 
index, w. 
The technical change effect is measured as the decrease in the efficient input quantity 
(x
A – x
B) needed to produce output y
t allowed by the improvement in technology, the shift 
in the production technology frontiers from F
t to F
t+1 in Figure 4. To produce a monetary 
valuation  that  can  be  related  to  the  evolution  of  profits,  the  change  in  efficient  input 
quantities is multiplied by the Bennet input price index. Productivity is defined as the sum 
of  operating  efficiency  and  technical  change  effects  (Grifell-Tatjé  and  Lovell,  1999, 
2014a). 
The  calculation  of  the  activity,  operating  efficiency,  and  technical  change  effects 
require estimation of the unobserved input vectors: x
A, x
B, and x
C. Figure 4 shows that 
these vectors lie on the frontiers F
t and F
t+1. These vectors can be expressed in terms of 20 
 
observable inputs and easy-to-estimate distance function procedures that are developed in 
the appendix. 
4. Data 
Walmart went public in October, 1970. For the first level of analysis, this empirical 
investigation covers the period from 1971 to 2008. Because calculations of best-practice 
frontiers require substantial amounts of data, the second level of analysis covers the period 
from 1977 to 2008. The data from 1971 to 1977 is used to build the first best-practice 
frontier (see appendix). To estimate best-practice frontiers, we use data from Walmart and 
six additional discount retailers: Kmart, Target, Sears, May, Costco, and Bradlees (Table 
1). The data comes from annual reports and publicly available financial statements. We also 
used the Osiris database and analysts reports (from Thompson-Financial) to build a time 
series of employee counts and to complete information about Sam’s Club. In the 31-year 
period  for  which  we  construct  best-practice  frontiers,  some  discount  retailers  went 
bankrupt, some were taken over, and some merged with other firms. Firms after a merger or 
an acquisition are treated as new companies.
17 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The measure of performance is operating profits, or profits from revenues generated 
from  the  firm’s  retail  operations.  Thus  the  accounting  record  “other  income”  (which 
averages about 1% of total sales) is not included in these calculations. To obtain operating 
                                                 
17 In the case of Costco, the company merged with Price in 1993. Costco is therefore treated as two separate 
firms, one prior to the merger and the other afterwards. Kmart filed for bankruptcy in 2002. The successor 
company survived for two years before merging with Sears. Each circumstance was treated as a separate case 
(three firms). May Department Stores was treated as two separate companies, one before the acquisition of 
Caldor and the other after the acquisition. We include information about May until 2003.  Kmart, Target and 
May had multiple retail formats during the period of study. The financial information on these businesses is 
not separated from discount retailing activities. We do not consider this a problem, as all these activities are in 
the same line of business. The same is not true for Sears which had a very broad spectrum of businesses 
besides retailing (e.g. Dean Witter, Allstate Insurance Company, Coldwell Banker among others). For this 
reason, it was essential to analyze the merchandise part only. Fortunately, Sears discloses information on each 
division separately. We therefore include only the retail part of Sears. 21 
 
profits,  we  subtract  cost  of  sales,  operating,  general  and  administrative  expenses,  and 
capital cost from revenue. Using the consumer price index, all figures are deflated to 1970. 
Consistent  with  their  consideration  within  Walmart,  we  treat  discount  stores  and 
Sam’s Club as separate entities. Thus we define two outputs: y1 = average of beginning-of-
year  and  end-of-year  real  discount  stores  sales  (deflated  to  1970)  and  y2  =  average  of 
beginning-of-year and end-of-year real Sam’s Club sales (deflated to 1970). We use value 
added per dollar of sales by store format (discount stores and Sam’s Club), defined as sales 
minus cost of intermediate goods, as the measure of price for each of the two outputs (p).
18 
The  use  of  real  value  added  simplifies  and  homogenizes  outputs  in  an  industry 
characterized by major heterogeneity in disclosure policies among retailers. 
We define two inputs: labor and capital. Labor quantity, x1, is captured by the average 
beginning-of-year and end-of-year number of employees. Total labor cost would be the 
ideal price variable w1 for x1. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available data on labor 
cost for Walmart. Drogin (2003) has gathered sparse labor cost data and other researchers 
have used Drogin’s data to project total labor costs at Walmart. It was not possible to apply 
the  same  approach  here  because  this  study  begins  in  1971.  Therefore,  we  chose  real 
operating, general and administrative expenses as a proxy for labor costs. Thus w1 is the 
ratio  of  real  operating,  general  and  administrative  expenses  to  the  average  number  of 
employees each year. 
The  second  input  is  capital.  The  standard  approach  is  followed  to  quantify  this: 
capital in period t equals capital in period t-1 minus amortization expenses plus investment 
in period t (all amounts expressed in 1970 dollars). Data on capital was obtained from 
annual reports where a measure of net property and equipment is provided. Amortization 
expense  is  calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  accumulated  amortization  and 
depreciation expenses from period t to period t-1. Quantity of capital, x2, is then the average 
beginning-of-year  and  end-of-year  capital  (computed  as  described  above).  The  price  of 
                                                 
18  No  information  is  available  on  the  value  added  amount  for  each  type  of  retail  format,  discount  and 
warehouse club at Walmart. However, we know the total sales and the operating profit obtained by each 
branch for every year in the sample. We assume that the value added is distributed in the same way as the 
income variable is distributed each year. 22 
 
capital, w2, is the ratio of the sum of current depreciation and amortization expenses plus 
the net interest paid to the quantity of input capital for the period. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 presents averages for each of the variables as well as their rates of growth. In 
general  terms,  we  see  a  moderation  in  growth  rates  as  the  company  increased  in  size. 
Summarized statistics are presented for each of the three CEOs. In February 2009, Mike 
Duke  was  appointed  Walmart’s  fourth  Chief  Executive  Officer.  He  is  therefore  not 
included in this study. Due to the lack of data before Walmart’s IPO, we cover seventeen 
years (1971-1987) of Walton’s tenure, a period in which Walmart grew rapidly. This is 
noticeable in the double-digit growth in output, capital and labor. Capital prices increased 
moderately,  while  output  and  labor  prices  fell.  Glass’s  term  is  similar,  though  less 
aggressive: capital costs decreased and labor costs increased by less than 1%. Finally, under 
Scott, Walmart’s discount store sales rose by an average of 8.6%, markedly less than under 
Walton and Glass. Output prices (value added) grew an insignificant 0.4%. Capital and 
labor prices showed similar behavior to that under earlier CEOs. The increase in Sam’s 
Club sales was less than that experienced by Walmart’s discount stores. Average capital 
input growth was higher than labor input growth for all three periods; thus, there has been a 
trend towards substituting capital with labor throughout Walmart’s history. 
5. Results 
Table 3 presents our decomposition of profit variation.
19 Columns 3 and 4 show the 
results of the first level of analysis (equation 1), the decomposition of change in real profit 
into price and quantity effects. Of course, the sum of these two columns equals column 2. 
The results from the second level of analysis are shown in columns 5, 6, 7, and 8. There, we 
decompose the quantity effect into the activity and productivity effects and the productivity 
                                                 
19  These  computations  were  programmed  in  the  statistical  package  R.  To  calculate  the  input  distance 
functions, we used the FEAR (Frontier Efficiency Analysis for R) package by Paul Wilson.  23 
 
effect  into  operating  efficiency,  and  technical  change.  Columns  5  and  6  are  added  to 
produce column 4, the quantity effect, and columns 7 and 8 are added to produce column 6, 
the productivity effect. Columns 5, 7 and 8 correspond to equation (2). Table 4 provides 
further details of the price effect by breaking it down by outputs and inputs. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In general terms we observe an increase in the values of the components of profit 
change. Table 3 shows that prices had a negative impact and quantities a positive impact on 
profits. The quantity effect more than compensated for the price effect, so the resulting 
change in profit was positive. Table 4 shows that the output price effect was generally 
negative during Walton’s and Glass’s tenure, but positive under Scott. Capital input prices 
decreased, while labor prices increased (with the exception of Walton’s years). The analysis 
shows  that  Walmart  generated  profit  through  continuous  aggressive  expansion  (activity 
effect) without compromising operating efficiency. Walmart’s growth was based on low 
prices and was possible because the company shared productivity gains with customers. 
Thus,  increases  in  input  prices  did  not  result  in  increases  in  output  prices.  Walmart’s 
investment in technology paid off, and was critical in overcoming the company’s early 
inefficient growth. A detailed analysis of each CEO’s tenure is now presented. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Sam Walton 1972-1988: 
Real  profits  rose  during  Sam  Walton’s  tenure.
20  The  price  effect  was  slightly 
negative, while the quantity effect was notably positive. Table 4 reveals that the output 
price effect was generally negative, which implies a reduction in real value added per item 
                                                 
20 The only exception was the 1973-1974 period (Table 3). The explanation for this fall in profits was the 
adoption of the LIFO method of costing inventories. The change in accounting practice resulted in a reduction 
in earnings of 1.8 million 1970 dollars in real terms, although the company profits rose if measured in current 
dollars (AR, 1975, p.1). 24 
 
sold.  The  input  price  effect  was  also  negative,  which  is  consistent  with  the  cost 
consciousness and human resource practices applied by Walton. Since the price effect is 
defined as the difference between output price effect and input price effect, for some years 
the firm enjoyed positive price effects because it did not pass on all the savings obtained by 
controlling costs to customers. Negative output price effects are associated with EDLP and 
pressure on vendors. 
In aggregate terms, the productivity effect was more important than the activity effect 
during Walton’s tenure (Table 3). The results of this study show that technology was the 
most important lever during Walton’s years, accounting for more than 65% of the change in 
profits. Walmart’s early success mainly came from levers linked to operational efficiency 
and technological change, which are reflected in improvements in productivity. 
Taking  a  closer  look,  there  are  evidently  two  different  periods  during  Walton’s 
tenure. Before 1983, the company was reporting a mostly positive price effect. The input 
price was generally negative (the firm was paying less for capital and labor) while the 
output price effect fluctuated. The operative inefficiency of the company nullified a large 
percentage of the total value created by the business model (60%), the main contributors to 
which were the activity effect and input prices. It can be deduced that the inefficiencies 
hindered the full application of EDLP. This would be captured by a significantly negative 
output  price  effect.  After  1983,  when  the  discount  retail  chain  invested  heavily  in 
technology, there was a significant shift in the behavior of the profit change components. 
Output  prices  became  much  more  negative,  the  contribution  of  technological  change 
became positive and Walmart recovered from its operational inefficiency. We believe that 
this is one of the turning points of Walmart’s history. Without the decision to invest heavily 
in technology, its future would have been completely different. 
1981 was special, as reflected in Tables 3 and 4 (for the 1980-1981 period). This was 
the year that Walmart made its first major acquisition: Kuhn’s Big K stores. Sam Walton 
made the following statement about the event: “But we’d never bitten off anything close to 
this size before, and we didn’t know what it would be like trying to digest it” (Walton, 
1992, p. 197). This acquisition could explain the singular values for the output prices and 
the price of capital. This year was also exceptional due to a 41% increase in sales (in 25 
 
nominal  terms),  the  second  largest  in  the  complete  series  (the  largest  increase  in  sales 
occurred in the 1972-1973 period). 
David Glass 1988-2000: 
As opposed to Walton’s era, change in profit during Glass’s period was mainly due to 
the  activity  effect.  The  company  experienced  few  technological  improvements  and  no 
changes in efficiency levels (observe David Glass’s subtotal row in Table 3). When Glass 
left, Walmart’s sales were 12 times greater than when Walton stepped down. The analysis 
reveals that the secret to Glass’s success was his emphasis on all levers related to the 
activity effect while keeping Walmart operationally efficient. Table 4 shows that the output 
price effect was mainly negative (as in Walton’s case), while the input prices of capital and 
labor followed different trends. Specifically, the labor input price effect was positive (in 
aggregate terms), as opposed to what had happened in the previous period. Labor real 
prices therefore increased under Glass’s administration. On the other hand, the capital input 
price effect was negative for the whole period. 
As described in Section 2, David Glass pulled some business model levers differently 
to Sam Walton. These differences mainly affected the quantity effect. Walton’s years were 
characterized by the importance of investing in technology and improving efficiency, while 
in Glass’s years, Walmart focused more on business choices that expanded the business, 
such as building new stores, increasing product variety and improving customer service 
which are mainly reflected in the activity effect. 
Three years (1991, 1995, and 1997) warrant separate discussion. In 1991, the price 
effect decreased substantially (although the activity effect more than compensated for it). In 
December 1990, Walmart completed the acquisition of McLane (a company that provided 
and  distributed  goods  to  different  retail  stores,  including  Walmart).  At  the  same  time, 
Walmart was fully deploying Sam’s Club nationwide.
21 Both Sam’s Club and McLane had 
lower  mark-ups  than  Walmart.  This  could  explain  why  the  company’s  output  prices 
                                                 
21 When Walton left the CEO position in 1988, there were 105 Sam’s Club stores; by 1991 that number was 
205.  26 
 
decreased substantially in 1991. The strong positive activity effect in 1991 could reflect the 
higher  output  and  input  quantities  associated  with  the  acquisition  of  McLane  and  the 
expansion of Sam’s Club. 
Walmart had a difficult year in 1995. In previous years, sales were growing at rates 
greater than 20% but in 1995 the growth rate was only 13%. The company was investing 
heavily outside the U.S. with mixed results. Sam’s Club was not performing as expected; 
its sales growth rate was below inflation in 1995. Although this information is not reported 
in the tables, the output quantity effect for Sam’s Club never recovered the growth levels of 
prior to 1995. 
The price effect became positive after 1997. Table 4 reveals that the output price 
effect (which used to be negative) was positive at that time. A possible explanation could 
be the outward spread of the supercenter format. In 1997, the number of discount stores 
declined while the number of supercenters increased significantly. Thus, the expansion of 
the  supercenter  format  appears  to  have  occurred  together  with  a  weakening  of  EDLP.  
Additionally, several systems that improved inventory management and a change in the 
merchandise mix were implemented during those years which reduced the cost of sales 
(AR, 1998, p.5). This could be the cause behind the significant technical change between 
1997 and 1998, as well as contributing indirectly to the moderation of EDLP. Despite 
Walmart obtaining higher value added per dollar sold, the activity effect remained strong, 
though smaller, than in previous years. 
Lee Scott 2000-2008: 
Scott’s tenure was characterized by a moderation in growth rates. Walmart’s profit 
increased not only because of changes in activity levels, but also because of improvements 
in productivity due to technical change (see subtotal in Table 3). The company enjoyed 
substantial technical progress and the price effect had a similar negative impact to that of 
the previous period. Nevertheless, the output price effect (Table 4) changed sign, becoming 
positive  in  aggregate  terms.  This  result  suggests  a  laxer  implementation  of  EDLP. 
However, the labor input price effect was the component that showed the most striking 
shift.  Labor  prices  increased  significantly  during  this  period.  Company  records  show 27 
 
increases in insurance and payroll-related costs.
22 The present analysis indicates that of all 
the levers that were pulled differently by Lee Scott as described in Section 2, it was human 
resource practices that had the largest effect on Walmart’s performance during this period. 
Walmart’s biggest rival, Kmart, declared bankruptcy in 2002. Two years before, both 
companies had been engaged in a price war.
23 The effects of this price war can be seen in 
David  Glass’s  last  year,  and  the  first  years  under  Lee  Scott,  when  output  prices  were 
negative  (Table  4)  and  there  was  a  boom  in  productivity  (Table  3).  After  Kmart’s 
bankruptcy, there was a change in trend for the output price effect. 
2003 warrants separate analysis. McLane was sold that year for $1.5 billion and the 
company recorded extraordinary income of $151 million after taxes. Walmart sold McLane 
because it did not fit with its core business. McLane’s sales in 2002 were $14.9 billion, so 
its influence on the company’s finances was substantial. The component of profit change 
most affected by this sale was the activity effect. 
The final year in the series shows a negative change in real profits. In current dollars, 
Walmart registered an increase in profits. However, profits grew less than inflation. The 
main reasons for the poor performance were a disappointing year for Sam’s Club, almost 
zero contribution of productivity and a very modest activity effect. 
6. Conclusions 
The  aim  of  this  paper  has  been  to  contribute  to  the  extant  literature  on  business 
models.  Building  on  Casadesus-Masanell  and  Ricart’s  (2010)  framework,  we  have 
introduced the notion of business model lever, which helps to disentangle two perspectives 
on business models: they can be conceived as scale models or as role models (Baden-Fuller 
and Morgan, 2010). Levers correspond to the scale model viewpoint, which defines the set 
of categories of choices available for a particular business type. In our case, we define the 
typical elements found in discount retail chains. Business model choices are the actual 
                                                 
22 Walmart applied a new pay structure for U.S. workers in 2004. 
23  The  Economist.  2002.  The  blue  light  blues,  the  perils  of  trying  out-Wal-mart  Wal-mart.  June  17th, 
http://www.economist.com/node/941028/print, Accessed August 12th, 2013. 28 
 
realizations of these levers; they determine whether a specific, realized business model 
should  be  considered  a  role  model.  At  the  scale  level,  two  business  models  might  be 
considered identical but the actual implementations would be the critical determinants of 
their  success.  We  found  that  although  the  core  of  Walmart’s  business  models  did  not 
change in the period of analysis, the emphasis on certain business choices (how the levers 
were “pulled”) made a significant difference. 
Although the literature on business models is rich in theoretical frameworks that help 
analysts describe business models qualitatively, little progress has been made in developing 
micro-founded methods to quantify business model performance. Ours is a first step in this 
direction. Specifically, relying on the economics of business performance, our analysis has 
shown three distinct stages in the evolution of Walmart. In the first one, Walmart was under 
the management of a visionary leader (Sam Walton) who implemented several choices that 
sought to achieve cost leadership. The second stage was characterized by a large-scale 
deployment of the original business concept. The final stage corresponds to the downside 
of success. Walmart’s human resource practices were criticized, which prompted higher 
salaries and benefits to employees. 
As a discount retailer, Walmart’s business model is oriented at selling more goods by 
reducing prices. What makes the company remarkable is its ability to grow while staying 
highly efficient. Walmart highlights the importance of business model choices that generate 
growth in the discount retail industry, such as the creation of a network of distribution 
centers and increased product variety. Our analysis suggests that these choices—captured 
by the activity effect—explain a large share of profit change for Walmart. Interestingly, 
other  retailers  such  as  Kmart  attempted  to  emulate  Walmart  (especially  by  setting  low 
prices) and failed. This suggests that while Walmart increased its business by selling more 
goods at low prices (as any discount retailer would), its success was ultimately due to the 
overall implementation of its business model, with its many complementary choices.
24  
The method employed has some limitations. As noted above, our approach cannot 
identify whether business model choices are reactions to changes in the institutional context 
                                                 
24 Despite having an apparently insurmountable advantage in the mid-1980s, Kmart declared bankruptcy in 
2002. 29 
 
within which they were made (e.g. a store manager raising wages in response to a new 
government  policy)  or  they  are  proactive  decisions  made  by  managers  to  influence 
outcomes (the store manager choosing to rise wages to attract qualified employees). In 
order to address this issue one must complement our quantitative method with a detailed 
analysis  of  case  facts.  Still,  the  quantitative  analysis  may  be  used  as  a  problem-
identification  device  and  thus  can  be  applied  independently  of  the  qualitative  business 
model examination. For example, by applying the method, a manager may become aware 
that the operating efficiency effect is detrimental to profits. In that case, the manager could 
analyse  the  firm’s  business  model  and  focus  on  reconfiguring  the  levers  that  affect 
operating efficiency. 
The method proposed is an application of nonparametric empirical techniques, which 
have the advantage of not imposing particular functional forms governing relationships 
between variables. Moreover, we do not need to assume that managers optimize. On the 
other hand, nonparametric techniques have a deterministic approach; they do not consider 
statistical noise, a drawback that hinders the application of statistical inference and neglects 
measurement errors. These issues remain open and are subjects of current research. Another 
option  is  to  use  stochastic  methods  but  this  would  require  a  much  larger  dataset  and 
distributional and functional assumptions.
25  
In addition to the results on Walmart discussed in Section 5, our proposed method 
delivers comparable insights on the set of competitors considered to build the common 
benchmark  frontier.  We  did  not  make  use  of  this  information  because  we  focused  on 
Walmart. A future line of research could exploit these data to produce detailed assessments 
of how industries evolve. In addition, the method is flexible in that it allows the possibility 
of evaluating business models in relation to specific competitors instead of in relation to a 
common  frontier.  We  are  currently  pursuing  this  line  of  research  by  studying  the 
interactions between Walmart and Kmart’s models to understand the influence of business 
model innovation on the performance of conventional models.  Finally, when fine-grained 
proprietary  data  are  available,  the  method  delivers  more  nuanced,  less  aggregated 
                                                 
25  Coelli,  et  al.  (2003)  explain  in  more  detail  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  index  numbers, 
stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis. 30 
 
quantifications.  For  example,  it  is  possible  to  use  this  study’s  approach  for  internal 
assessment, especially when business levers are adjusted and the implementation of these 
adjustments  is  done  gradually.  Specifically,  the  method  is  useful  to  contrast  the 
performance of different units within a company. 
The results revealed that while the first three CEOs pulled Walmart’s business model 
levers differently, the business model did not change. Perhaps the most important challenge 
currently  faced  by  Michael  Duke  (CEO  since  2009)  is  deciding  whether  to  continue 
Walmart’s traditional business model (and consider pulling levers differently) or to come 
up with a different, original set of levers that fundamentally redefines what it means to 
compete in discount retail. For example, how important should the online channel be to 
Walmart and what should the company do to build a competitive advantage in that area? Or 
should Walmart adopt elements of multi-sided platforms in addition to those of a merchant? 
Hopefully, the proposed method can guide companies that wish to transform their business 
models by quantifying the effects of such transformations. 
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Figure 1. Walmart’s real profits from 1972 to 2008. 
 36 
 
Figure 2. Walmart’s discount retailer business model. 
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Figure 3. Visual representation of the methodology. 
 
This figure should be read from left to right. In the first part, there is a change in profit from 
period t to t+1, under the assumption of positive profit change. This change in profit can be 
explained  as  a  result  of  changes  in  prices  (price  effect)  and/or  changes  in  quantities 
(quantity effect). This level of analysis uses Index Number Theory. The quantity effect can 
be  further  decomposed  into  three  different  components.  The  first  two  elements  are 
operating efficiency and technical change, which together define productivity change. The 
third component is the activity effect.  
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Figure 4. Decomposition of quantity effect for the case M = N = 1. 
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Table 1. List of companies in the dataset. 
Company  Period  Description 
Walmart   1971-2008  Discount stores (domestic and international)  
Sam’s Club  1983-2008  Warehouse club 
Target  1971-2008   
Kmart  1971-2002  Filed for bankruptcy in 2002 
Kmart post-bankruptcy  2003-2004  Merged with Sears in 2005 
Sears  1994-2004  Merged with Kmart in 2005 
Sears / Kmart  2005-2008   
Costco  1984-1992  Ancestor company 
Costco  1993-2008  Successor company 
Bradlees  1971-1986  Went bankrupt in 1995 and again in 2000 
May  1971-1985  Acquired Caldor in 1985 
May post-Caldor acquisition  1986-2003  Only until 2003 40 
 
Table 2. Average and average growth rate of variables of interest under each CEO. 
 
Sam Walton (1971-
1988) 
David Glass (1988-
2000)  Lee Scott (2000-2008)  Total 
  Average 
Avg. 
Growth  Average 
Avg. 
Growth  Average 
Avg. 
Growth  Average 
Avg. 
Growth 
y1  1,164.54  28.5%  15,145.10  18.2%  49,226.15  8.6%  17,389.44  20.09% 
y2  356.75  162.8%  3,608.18  18.9%  7,282.48  4.6%  4,410.70  31.51% 
p1  0.29  -0.9%  0.24  -0.8%  0.24  0.4%  0.26  -0.52% 
p2  0.27  -14.7%  0.17  -2.2%  0.16  -0.3%  0.18  -3.03% 
x capital  201.47  34.9%  3,943.43  22.4%  15,636.50  11.4%  5,169.54  24.87% 
w capital  0.16  2.1%  0.11  -2.2%  0.08  -3.0%  0.12  -0.61% 
x labor  42.34  32.2%  548.04  16.7%  1,616.33  8.1%  589.22  21.01% 
w labor  6.45  -3.3%  5.26  0.8%  5.83  1.1%  5.91  -0.83% 
 
Variable  Measurement 
y1  Discount store sales expressed in millions of 1970 dollars  
y2  Warehouse club sales expressed in millions of 1970 dollars  
p1  Discount store, value added per dollar sold in 1970 dollars 
p2  Warehouse, value added per dollar sold in 1970 dollars 
x capital  Capital valued at prices of 1970 (in millions) 
w capital  Cost of capital per dollar invested in capital in 1970 dollars 
x labor  Number of workers (thousands)  
w labor  Operating, General & Administrative expenses per 1,000 employees in millions of 1970 dollars 
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Table 3. Decomposition of change in profits (millions of 1970 dollars). 
 
Period  Change in 
Profits [2] 
Change in Profits  Quantity Effect  Productivity Effect 
Price  
Effect [3] 
Quantity 
Effect [4] 
Activity 
Effect [5] 
Productivity 
Effect[6] 
Technical 
Change [7] 
Operational 
Efficiency [8] 
S
a
m
 
W
a
l
t
o
n
 
1972 – 1973  1.63  -0.41  2.05  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
1973 – 1974  -1.34  0.30  -1.64  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
1974 – 1975  6.04  6.26  -0.23  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
1975 – 1976  4.21  -2.04  6.25  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
1976 – 1977  3.81  1.53  2.28  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
1977 – 1978  6.88  4.49  2.39  15.96  -13.56  -  -13.56 
1978 – 1979  6.22  -1.04  7.26  14.62  -7.36  -  -7.36 
1979 – 1980  6.80  8.29  -1.49  13.44  -14.93  -  -14.93 
1980 – 1981  14.92  23.47  -8.55  16.22  -24.77  -  -24.77 
1981 – 1982  25.22  -2.22  27.44  37.47  -10.04  -  -10.04 
1982 – 1983  40.83  -4.75  45.58  40.11  5.47  -  5.47 
1983 – 1984  45.78  1.63  44.15  -26.82  70.97  -  70.97 
1984 – 1985  30.13  -17.20  47.33  -12.47  59.80  59.80  - 
1985 – 1986  71.83  -0.66  72.49  5.75  66.74  66.74  - 
1986 – 1987  59.36  -30.20  89.56  25.76  63.80  63.80  - 
1987 – 1988  60.59  -29.09  89.67  37.99  51.68  51.68  - 
Total 1977-1988  368.56  -47.28  415.84  168.03  247.81  242.03  5.78 
Total 1972-1988  382.91  -41.65  424.55  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
D
a
v
i
d
 
G
l
a
s
s
 
1988 – 1989  90.15  12.13  78.02  43.11  34.90  34.90  - 
1989 – 1990  48.80  -8.94  57.74  48.27  9.47  9.47  - 
1990 - 1991  83.97  -134.72  218.68  159.06  59.62  59.62  - 
1991 - 1992  125.05  -164.76  289.81  289.81  -  -  - 
1992 - 1993  81.36  -30.86  112.21  112.21  -  -  - 
1993 - 1994  56.76  -48.17  104.94  104.94  -  -  - 
1994 - 1995  -57.01  -224.17  167.16  135.74  31.42  31.42  - 
1995 - 1996  61.33  -92.07  153.41  153.41  -  -  - 
1996 - 1997  178.05  114.28  63.78  63.78  -  -  - 
1997 - 1998  310.81  99.11  211.70  132.10  79.60  79.60  - 
1998 - 1999  328.85  183.66  145.19  145.19  -  -  - 
1999 - 2000  179.69  36.04  143.65  143.65  -  -  - 
Total 1988-2000  1,487.82  -258.47  1,746.29  1,531.27  215.02  215.02  - 
L
e
e
 
S
c
o
t
t
 
2000 – 2001  293.09  -27.79  320.88  203.12  117.76  117.76  - 
2001 – 2002  369.71  -210.09  579.80  444.73  135.07  135.07  - 
2002 – 2003  -44.74  -317.76  273.01  273.01  -  -  - 
2003 – 2004  275.44  703.23  -427.78  -427.78  -  -  - 
2004 – 2005  87.89  209.36  -121.47  -187.66  66.19  66.19  - 
2005 – 2006  95.85  -233.39  329.24  272.79  56.45  56.45  - 
2006 – 2007  39.26  -303.61  342.88  192.78  150.10  150.10  - 
2007 – 2008  -14.23  -83.59  69.36  66.66  2.70  2.70  - 
Total 2000-2008  1,102.27  -263.64  1,365.91  837.65  528.27  528.27  - 
Total 1977-2008  2,958.64  -569.39  3,528.04  2,536.95  991.09  985.31  5.78 
Total 1972-2008  2,972.99  -563.76  3,536.75  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
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Table 4. Decomposition of price effect (millions of 1970 dollars). 
  Period  Output   
Price 1 
Output  
Price 2 
Output  
Price Effect 
Input  
Price K 
Input  
Price L 
Input  
Price Effect 
Price  
Effect 
S
a
m
 
W
a
l
t
o
n
 
1972 – 1973  -1.70  -  -1.70  1.10  -2.39  -1.28  -0.41 
1973 - 1974  -1.81  -  -1.81  0.72  -2.83  -2.11  0.30 
1974 - 1975  2.81  -  2.81  -0.62  -2.83  -3.46  6.26 
1975 - 1976  0.93  -  0.93  0.08  2.88  2.97  -2.04 
1976 - 1977  -2.30  -  -2.30  -3.10  -0.73  -3.83  1.53 
1977 - 1978  -0.17  -  -0.17  -0.86  -3.81  -4.66  4.49 
1978 - 1979  -0.71  -  -0.71  -0.88  1.22  0.34  -1.04 
1979 - 1980  -5.02  -  -5.02  -1.29  -12.03  -13.31  8.29 
1980 - 1981  19.79  -  19.79  4.10  -7.77  -3.67  23.47 
1981 – 1982  -1.58  -  -1.58  -0.62  1.25  0.63  -2.22 
1982 – 1983  -2.09  -  -2.09  -5.43  8.09  2.66  -4.75 
1983 – 1984  -14.74  -  -14.74  -0.14  -16.23  -16.37  1.63 
1984 – 1985  -47.54  -5.65  -53.19  -4.57  -31.42  -35.99  -17.20 
1985 – 1986  18.63  -14.04  4.59  4.76  0.49  5.25  -0.66 
1986 – 1987  -50.88  -20.95  -71.83  3.07  -44.70  -41.62  -30.20 
1987 – 1988  -48.20  -18.42  -66.62  -1.80  -35.73  -37.53  -29.09 
Total 1972-1988  -134.58  -59.06  -193.64  -5.46  -146.53  -151.99  -41.65 
D
a
v
i
d
 
G
l
a
s
s
 
1988 – 1989  -10.51  -15.72  -26.23  -11.29  -27.07  -38.36  12.13 
1989 – 1990  -35.59  4.21  -31.38  -8.50  -13.94  -22.44  -8.94 
1990 – 1991  -20.69  -6.89  -27.58  10.56  96.57  107.14  -134.72 
1991 – 1992  -85.45  -20.13  -105.59  -19.86  79.04  59.17  -164.76 
1992 – 1993  2.39  -21.22  -18.83  1.65  10.38  12.03  -30.86 
1993 – 1994  -25.56  27.72  2.16  11.95  38.39  50.34  -48.17 
1994 – 1995  -101.19  -99.45  -200.63  12.65  10.89  23.54  -224.17 
1995 – 1996  -90.75  1.47  -89.28  -46.42  49.21  2.79  -92.07 
1996 – 1997  109.95  6.38  116.33  -42.21  44.27  2.05  114.28 
1997 – 1998  169.32  3.05  172.37  -12.80  86.06  73.26  99.11 
1998 – 1999  144.05  41.71  185.75  19.50  -17.41  2.09  183.66 
1999 – 2000  -188.06  -14.97  -203.03  -36.77  -202.30  -239.07  36.04 
Total 1988-2000  -132.09  -93.85  -225.94  -121.55  154.08  32.54  -258.47 
L
e
e
 
S
c
o
t
t
 
2000 – 2001  -185.09  -10.93  -196.03  -45.71  -122.52  -168.23  -27.79 
2001 – 2002  140.70  -7.73  132.97  -132.89  475.94  343.05  -210.08 
2002 – 2003  17.98  40.41  58.40  -42.97  419.12  376.15  -317.76 
2003 – 2004  559.41  -6.53  552.88  -48.93  -101.41  -150.35  703.23 
2004 – 2005  -5.02  6.09  1.07  -34.25  -174.03  -208.28  209.36 
2005 – 2006  317.84  3.93  321.77  53.86  501.30  555.16  -233.39 
2006 – 2007  -162.34  -2.42  -164.76  45.57  93.29  138.86  -303.61 
2007 – 2008  -12.29  -44.61  -56.90  -8.91  35.60  26.69  -83.59 
Total 2000 – 2008  671.20  -21.79  649.41  -214.24  1,127.29  913.05  -263.64 
Total 1972 – 2008  404.54  -174.70  229.84  -341.24  1,134.84  793.60  -563.76 
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Appendix 
The  calculation  of  the  activity,  operating  efficiency,  and  technical  change  effects 
require estimates of the unobserved input vectors: x
A, x
B, and x
C. Figure 4 shows that these 
vectors  lie  on  the  frontiers  F
t  and  F
t+1.  These  vectors  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of 
observable inputs and easy-to-estimate distance functions. 
We define the same-period input distance function as D
t(y
t,x
t)  =  max{θ: (y
t, x
t/θ) ∈ 
F
t}. D
t(y
t,x
t) ≥ 1 because when x
t is producing the maximum feasible output with period t’s 
technology (x
t ∈ F
t), we have D
t(y
t,x
t) = 1. The adjacent-period input distance function 
D
t+1(y
t,x
t) is obtained by replacing F
t with F
t+1. Because some input/output combinations in 
period t+1 may not be feasible under period t’s technology, we have D
t+1(y
t,x
t) > = <1. 
Input vectors x
A, x
B, and x
C are radial expansions of the observed quantity vectors 
(x
t,y
t) and (x
t+1,y
t+1). It is easy to see that the technically efficient period t input vector x
A 
can be expressed as x
t/D
t(y
t,x
t). Likewise, the technically efficient period t+1 input vector 
x
C is given by x
t+1/D
t+1(y
t+1,x
t+1). Finally, x
B is a radial scaling of x
t to the boundary of F
t+1; 
therefore, x
B = x
t/D
t+1(y
t,x
t). Thus, if we calculate the input distance function D(x, y), we 
will be able to produce estimates of x
A, x
B and x
C, which are all we need to compute the 
activity, operating efficiency, and technical change effects. 
To  estimate  the  function  D(x,y)  we  use  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA),  a 
technique introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) and extended to production theory by Färe et 
al. (1985). DEA constructs best-practice frontiers, which provide empirical approximations 
to the production possibility y frontiers F
t and F
t+1. These frontiers are used to measure the 
performance of a producer relative to the best practice observed in the sample. 
We assume that the feasible set F
t includes all observations from period 1 to period t. 
Hence, the best-practice production possibility frontier in year t is constructed using data 
from all producers in all years prior to and including year t. In other words, best practices in 
previous years are remembered and remain available for use in the current year. Note that 
this approach does not allow for technical regression and implies that x
A ≧ x
B always (as in 
the example shown in Figure 4). 44 
 
The  unobserved  input  distance  function  D
t(y
t,x
t)  of  retailer  ‘
o’,  is  calculated  by 
solving the following linear program: 
[D
t
(y
ot
,x
ot
)]
-1
  = min φ
A 
φ
A,λ
S 
s.t        X
s λ
s ≤ φ
A
 x
ot,       y
ot ≤ Y
s λ
s,        λ
s ≥ 0,        Σi λi = 1.                                  (3) 
Consider period t. At time s ≤ t we have Is retailers; Y
s
 = [y
1s
,...,y
os,...,y
Is
] is an M×Σs
t
=1Is 
matrix of M outputs produced by all Is retailers in each of periods s = 1,...,t, and X
s
 = 
[x
1s
,...,x
os,...,x
Is
] is an N×Σs
t
=1Is matrix of N inputs used by Is retailers in each of the periods 
s = 1,...,t. The data matrices Y
s and X
s are sequential, i.e., they include output and input 
quantity data for all producers from the beginning of the sample through period t; λ
s is a 
Σs
t
=1Is×1  activity  vector  and,  finally,  the  convexity  constraint  Σiλi  =  1  allows  the 
approximating technology F
t to satisfy variable returns to scale, and to envelop the data 
tightly. This program is solved Σs
t
=1Is times, once for each retailer in each year, although we 
report only Walmart’s results. 
The outcome of the linear program (3) is φ
A, which enables the calculation of the 
unobserved  input  quantity  vector  x
oA  as  x
oA  =  φ
oAx
ot.  The  value  of  the  input  distance 
function D
t(y
ot,x
ot) = 1/φ
oA. The estimation of D
t+1(y
t+1,x
t+1) is similar to D
t(y
t,x
t). We need 
to replace (x
ot,y
ot) with (x
ot+1,y
ot+1) and s = 1,...,t with s = 1,...,t+1 in (3). Thus the solution 
of this new linear program is φ
oC which, as before, permits the valuation of x
oC as x
oC = 
φ
oCx
t+1 and the value of the input distance function as D
t+1(y
ot+1,x
ot+1) = 1/φ
oC. In the case of 
D
t+1(y
t,x
t) we replace s = 1,...,t with s = 1,...,t+1 in (3) and the outcome of this linear 
program  is  φ
oB  and  x
oB  =  φ
oBx
t.  As  before,  the  value  of  the  input  distance  function 
D
t+1(y
ot,x
ot) = 1/φ
oB. We calculate the activity, operating efficiency, and technical change 
effects by replacing x
A, x
B, and x
C in equation (2). 